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Social Supervision, Ethics and Risk: An Evaluation of How Ethical Frameworks 
Might Be Applied within the Social Supervision Process – Jeremy Dixon 
 
Abstract 
 
Service users subject to s. 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 come under the scrutiny 
of both the mental health and the criminal justice systems.  Much of the sociological 
literature in this area focuses on the growth of risk related practices where risk 
management is arguably displacing more traditional notions of care.  Social workers 
who are working with service users subject to s. 41 are faced with a number of ethical 
dilemmas.  This paper outlines Kantian, utilitarian and virtue ethics and their possible 
application to work with service users subject to s. 41.  The ethical dilemmas in 
applying risk assessment tools are then examined.  Finally, the article draws on 
published research of service user views in order to consider ethical dilemmas further.  
The author concludes by considering how social workers might apply the ethical 
principles discussed.    
 
 
 
 
Key Words 
 Risk, ethics, mental health, social supervision, supervised discharge, mentally 
disordered offenders, social work. 
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Introduction 
Service users who are subject to s. 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) are 
subject to restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Justice on the grounds that it is, 
‘necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm’ (quoted in Jones, 2008, 
p.234).   This article argues that whilst concern for the protection of the public is not a 
new concept within forensic mental health, the way in which risk is understood has 
changed and that this has altered the way in which this service user group is managed.  
The article outlines how sociological views about risk have been applied to both 
mental health and criminal justice and considers what effect this might have on 
mentally disordered offenders.   The emphasis on risk in legislation, policy and 
guidance is then examined.    It is argued that social workers face competing demands 
and that ethical frameworks should be applied in order to consider right action.  
Kantian, utilitarian and virtue ethics are then explored and consideration is given as to 
how social workers can apply such constructs to current risk management practices.  
Finally, literature focussing on the views of service users subject to s. 41 is explored 
in relation to their understanding of risk.  The author concludes that a utilitarian 
position is justified in work with this group of service users but that this position 
needs to be applied cautiously.  Social workers need to balance a utilitarian 
framework against an awareness of service user autonomy.  It is argued that risk 
assessment tools should be utilised but that social workers should use such tools in 
conjunction with their professional judgement.   
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The legal context 
An order under section 37 MHA is made by a judge on the evidence of two doctors.  
In order to do this, the court should be satisfied that hospital treatment is the most 
appropriate means of disposal.  In cases where a person is detained under s. 37 only, 
the clinician with responsibility for their case has the power to discharge the service 
user.  However, the court may also impose a ‘restriction order’ under  s. 41 of the 
MHA in cases where it is  of the opinion that detention in hospital is (Jones, 2008, 
p.234): 
‘necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm’.   
The order places the responsibility for discharge from hospital, transfers between 
hospitals, and leave, onto the Secretary of State.  The only other body with power to 
discharge a service user under a restriction order is the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal.  The Ministry of Justice or a Mental Health Review Tribunal may choose to 
discharge service users, subject to the conditions of s. 42 of the MHA.  Conditions 
may vary, but they will typically require service users to reside at a specified place of 
residence, to attend out-patient appointments and take prescribed medication and to 
meet on a regular basis with their social supervisor.  The social supervisor has the role 
of facilitating the service user’s return to the community, but also has a supervisory 
role.  The social supervisor is required to report on a regular basis to the Ministry of 
Justice, giving regular updates on the service user’s progress.  If a service user fails to 
meet their conditions, the Secretary of State has the power to recall them back to 
hospital 
 
The current legal and policy frameworks result in mentally disordered offenders being 
subject to two powerful social censures: that of being mentally ill and also deviant via 
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à vis society’s laws (Duff and Garland, 1995).  In doing so, they come to be defined 
by two of modern society’s most powerful professions: medicine and the law (Webb, 
1999).  Service users subject to s. 37 / 41 of the MHA are dealt with by both systems.  
Duff and Garland (1995) argue that mentally disordered offenders are primarily 
defined by society through their mental illness (how they are), rather than by their 
crime (what they have done).  However, this does not seem to be supported by the 
case law, which takes an equivocal position.  The nature of the restriction order was 
considered by the Court of Appeal in R v. Birch (1989) 11 Cr.App.R.(S.) 202 (quoted 
in Jones, 2008).  The court made the point that a restriction order merely qualifies a 
hospital order and was not a mode of punishment.  The ruling  goes on to say that 
(p.235): 
‘no longer is the offender regarded simply as a patient whose interests are 
paramount’. 
 
This creates an unusual position.  The person who is sentenced is handed over to the 
clinicians who may diagnose and treat them.  The seriousness of the crime allows the 
law to curtail the powers of discharge that a responsible clinician would normally 
hold in the interest of public protection.  Consequently, service users subject to s. 37 / 
41 are defined by both their mental disorder and their crime.   
 
The MHA states that s. 41 is imposed for the protection of the public, whilst case law 
positions the service user as both a patient to be treated and as an offender to be 
managed.  The Ministry of Justice guidance to social supervisors concentrates on the 
management of the offender and places the offender’s need for care as secondary to 
this.  Suggestions about the method of supervision are linked through the themes of 
risk and dangerousness.  The guidelines state that (2007, para 28): 
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‘It is the Secretary of State’s hope that, by means of conditional discharge of a           
restricted patient, a situation of danger to the patient or to others can be averted 
through effective supervision, by appropriate support in the community or by recall 
to hospital if need be.’   
 
The pre-occupation in the guidance with the management of risk echoes a pre-
occupation with risk in modern society as a whole.  The social nature of risk and how 
this relates to modern society will now be explored.   
 
The pre-occupation with risk 
Beck (1992) has famously argued that a pre-occupation with risk has become an 
intrinsic part of modern thinking.  He writes that society has come to demand that 
risks be identified and controlled by appropriate bodies and that this occurs despite 
the fact that such bodies may have a limited capacity to do so.  Douglas (1992 argues 
that this is because risk is not a ‘thing’ but a way of thinking.  Similarly Loader and 
Sparks (2007) put forward the view that risk is never a dry technocratic matter, but 
rather is a political matter in which certain groups come to be viewed as the bearers of 
risk.   
 
Public concern about risk from the mentally ill is not new.  A number of societies 
have associated ‘madness’ with violence (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999).   
Research by Philo et al. (1996) showed that media coverage of mental illness 
highlighted violence to others in 66% of cases.  However, the prevalence of violence 
suggested by such coverage does not reflect the levels of violence recorded.  Dunn 
(1999) points out that Ministry of Justice criminal statistics show little fluctuation in 
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the numbers of people with a mental health diagnosis committing homicide between 
the periods of 1957 and 1995.  In addition to this, the U.K. Audit Commission 
reported that there had been no increase in homicides by people with mental health 
problems between 1973 and 1993 (quoted in Flory and Darton, 2002).  However, as 
Barham (1997, p.167) has noted, whilst community care has been carried out with a 
measure of public sympathy: 
‘former mental patients are still under suspicion’. 
The public view towards the mentally ill acquires an extra level of complexity when 
offending is involved.  Risk theorists have argued that society has become more 
concerned with the distribution of risks than with the distribution of wealth (Beck, 
1992).  As a result of this, risk has replaced need as the principle around which health 
and social care services are organised (Kemshall, 2002).  Consequently public 
perceptions about which populations pose the greatest risks become important. Webb 
(1999, p.158-159) has written that: 
‘society is especially fearful of offenders who doubly transgress: those who are not 
only law breakers, but who in their mental deviancy are outside the domains of 
rational cognition’. 
 
This fear is mirrored in both the criminal justice system and the mental health system 
which have been increasingly influenced by risk assessment and management 
procedures (Loader and Sparks, 2007; Peay, 2007).  One reason for this is that the 
probabilistic models contained within the new risk management techniques appear to 
offer a greater degree of certainty than traditional models (Loader and Sparks, 2007).  
However, as Feeley and Simon (1992) have argued, such approaches have 
fundamentally changed the character of the criminal justice system.   This change has 
brought about a ‘new penology’ which : 
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  ‘is neither about punishing nor rehabilitating individuals.  It is about identifying and 
managing unruly groups’ (p. 368). 
 
 Modern society has developed a defensive attitude to risk in which the overarching 
aim is to be ‘safe rather than sorry’ (Kemshall, 2002, p. 9).  As Peay (2007) has 
argued  this risk-dominated approach within penology  has infiltrated   mental health 
policy.   Whilst previous policies adopted a broadly treatment-based approach, these 
are now being overridden by risk concerns.  This has led to a fusion between mental 
health and criminal justice objectives, with professionals being expected to engage in 
the potentially competing task of reformation and risk management with  
  ‘the latter taking precedence where the former is in peril’ (p.501). 
 
The notion that mentally disordered offenders may pose a risk towards others is, of 
course, not new.  What has changed is the system of assessing and managing such 
risks.  Assessment of mentally disordered offenders had previously been the domain 
of forensic psychiatrists who would make judgements on ‘dangerousness’ (2002). 
Rose argues that dangerousness was seen to be an internal quality of a few 
pathological individuals but that in the 1970s and 1980s this understanding mutated 
and became, ‘a matter of factors, of situations, of statistical probabilities’ (Rose, 2002, 
p. 210).   
 
Rose has argued that the growth of community psychiatry has, in turn, changed the 
character of forensic psychiatry.  He writes that whilst the rule of law is still 
applicable to offenders, a parallel concern has developed in which issues of the rights 
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of victims and the general public are also considered in the context of an increasing 
‘fear of crime’.  The logical consequence of this is that there is an increased demand 
that preventative action be taken against mentally disordered offenders and other 
groups who are seen to pose such a threat.    
 
The policy position 
Notions of risk management have gained an increasing profile in mental health policy 
generally.  The Care Programme Approach (CPA) was introduced in 1991 in order to 
assess and provide for the needs of service users (Department of Health, 1990).  
However, what was significant was that the assessment of risk was highlighted as an 
integral part of that approach.  ‘Audit packs’ were issued in 1996 and identified three 
tiers of CPA with risk as the key organising principle (Fennel and Yeates, 2002).  The 
National Service Framework for Mental Health (Department of Health, 1999) re-
emphasised the Government’s commitment to CPA. The Government’s vision for 
mental health was summarised as being to provide services which were (p. 8) ‘safe, 
sound and supportive’ with the definition of safety being:  
 
‘to protect the public and provide effective care for those with mental illness at the 
time they need it’.   
Notably, notions of public safety preceded requirements for service users to receive 
effective care.    In doing so the policy echoed concerns expressed in inquiries into 
mental health tragedies which highlighted the need for effective risk management 
strategies (Ritchie et al., 1994; Blom-Cooper, 1996).  Not all commentators have been 
uncritical of this direction of travel.  Preston-Shoot (1999) and Munro (2004) argue 
that policy has become tragedy-led and that such inquiries have focussed on 
individual situations, ignoring the context in which decisions were made.  They argue 
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that the narrow scope of inquiries ignores the complexities of policies and procedures, 
decision-making processes, the nature of risk, organisational cultures and 
contradictory societal expectations.  Despite such criticisms, inquiries have continued 
to highlight risk minimisation as a central aim.  Social workers providing care are 
faced with ethical dilemmas in deciding how to balance the competing demands of 
care and control.  Whilst social work literature has traditionally struggled with this 
notion generally, there is a shortage of literature dealing with ethical practice in 
relation to service users subject to s. 41.    
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Social work ethics  
Social workers working with service users subject to s. 41 will be required to consider 
their practice with reference to the Codes of Practice (General Social Care Council, 
2002).  In addition to this, they also have to deliver care which is in line with the 
requirements of the Care Programme Approach (Department of Health, 1999) and 
will also need to be mindful of Ministry of Justice Guidance (2007).  It is often 
difficult for social workers to navigate their way through the competing demands of 
professional standards, government policy and guidance from interested agencies.  In 
order to examine how they might proceed, it is useful to consider how these demands 
fit within an ethical framework.  Whilst ethical frameworks do not provide solutions 
to problems they can be effectively utilised as a tool for considering the basis for right 
action.   
 
Kantian ethics draw on the ideas of Immanuel Kant.  Kant’s theory postulates that 
individuals should act in the right way driven by a sense of moral duty.  Furthermore 
it presumes that individuals are endowed with reason and as such are capable of 
making moral choices.   Kant saw humans as having the ability to create normative 
ethics of behaviour in which unconditional sets of moral rules could be established.  
Crucially, Kant saw the pursuance of moral principles as an ethical duty.  The 
application of this form of ethics holds that human beings should always follow 
certain principles such as telling the truth or keeping a promise regardless of the 
consequences of such actions.  There are a number of difficulties in applying a 
Kantian system of ethics to service users subject to s. 41.  Firstly, this group of people 
are judged by the legal system to be  mentally disordered.   As such they do not fit the 
Kantian model of individuals endowed with reason.  Secondly, in deciding whether to 
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make an order under s. 41 the court is also bound to give consideration to their 
potential risk to the public (Fennel, 2007).  In so doing the court deviates from 
Kantian principles in that the outcome for the individual is considered in light of the 
wider social consequence rather than solely on individual action.   
 
Utilitarianism ethics act in contrast to the Kantian focus on individual action.  Within 
this theory action is seen as morally good if it produces the best possible outcomes for 
society as a whole.   Guttman (2006) argues that two versions of utilitarian theory 
exist.  The first of these posits that an act is correct if it achieves the best results and 
that this judgement is made irrespective of existing social laws.  The second version 
of the theory places the social law as the criterion by which right action is determined.   
Within this framework the good of society is considered in contrast to the happiness 
of the individual who makes that action.  Service users who are made subject to s. 41 
are placed firmly within the second version of this utilitarian framework as they are 
restricted by social laws.  In making a restriction order, the court is considering 
utilitarian notions of public protection rather than placing the basis for its judgement 
solely on the actions of the individual.  In terms of discharge, a Mental Health Review 
Tribunal must order the release of a service user who is not judged to be suffering 
from a mental disorder of a nature or degree warranting detention (Fennel, para 7.87).  
However, these judgements still come from a utilitarian position as the consideration 
of risk to self or others remains, provided that the service user is judged to be 
suffering from a mental disorder.   
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Writers on social work ethics have argued that virtue ethics may offer a better 
alternative to practice dilemmas than the principle-based theories outlined above.  
Banks (2008) reviews these current developments and   writes (p. 1243), 
‘challenges have come from a revival of virtue ethics (focussing on qualities of 
character), the development of an ethics of care (focussing on caring relationships), 
communitarian ethics (focussing on community, responsibility and co-operation) 
and pluralist, discursive and postmodern or anti-theory approaches to ethics 
(eschewing single, foundational all-embracing theories.’ 
Virtue ethics can be seen to reflect the core values of social work in that they aim to 
take account of the social inequalities which are seen to underpin the difficulties of 
individuals (Banks, 2001; Clark, 2000).  Webb (2006) argues that the adoption of 
virtue ethics should give social workers the scope to act on sociological and 
philosophical principles.  He suggests that this framework allows a focus on social 
relations and is not rule bound and argues that social workers should act as ‘strong 
evaluators’ who are able to, 
‘exercise an ethical sensibility and judgement that’s based on their ability to 
contrast and value the worth of things’ (p. 205). 
Webb’s vision of social workers as strong evaluators is an appealing one.  However, 
current literature dealing with the application of virtue ethics to social work practice is 
still speculative in nature (Banks, 2008).  In addition to this the application of virtue 
ethics also has certain problems when applied to service users subject to s. 41.  
Webb’s vision of virtue ethics works in antithesis to a utilitarian position.  He rejects 
social work practice based on the notion of risk and argues that practitioners should 
reject rule bound systems.  As we have previously seen, current law and policy 
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encourage practitioners to minimise risk.  Within this context social workers are faced 
with a number of risk assessment tools which claim to offer a means to risk reduction.  
This article will now consider these tools and question whether they can be applied in 
an ethical manner. 
 
Ethical dilemmas in the use of risk assessments 
Dolan and Doyle (2000) have identified three types of risk assessment within the 
current literature.  The first of these is unaided risk assessments in which practitioners 
make a judgement on risk through clinical symptoms.  The second type of risk 
assessment is actuarial methods which aim to provide assessment through 
measurement of a range of factors known to be associated with outcomes such as 
violence.  The third model is structured clinical judgement which evaluates a range of 
statistically relevant factors but also allows flexibility for clinicians to make their own 
judgement.   
 
Unaided risk assessments are the prevalent model in the UK (Walker, 2005).  These 
assessments rely on the skill of a practitioner to identify risks and prescribe 
preventative measures.   However, the accuracy of such practices has been challenged 
in research by Monahan (1984) that found that mental health professionals made 
erroneous predictions of violence in two thirds of cases.  This has led to a push toward 
actuarial methods on the basis that quantitative research has demonstrated these to be 
the most effective measure (Bonta et al., 1998).  Canton (2005) argues that whilst 
such tools often claim to predict risk, they are better understood as probability 
statements.  That is, the tools allow practitioners to calculate the probability that a 
person may commit a specific act through measuring specific traits.    However, 
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whilst such tools may highlight high and low risk groups they also have certain 
disadvantages.  Many of the identifiers of risk are static.  That is they may group 
individual risk levels based on factors such as sex or age.  In doing so, such tools 
often ignore individual factors (Walker, 2005) and also fail to deal with the residual 
majority of people in the middle-risk group (Home Office and DHSS, 1975; Prins, 
1995).  These limitations have led to the adoption of third generation risk assessments 
which aim to give due consideration to actuarial predictions whilst retaining 
professional decision making.   
 
An extra layer of complexity is created when applying risk assessment tools to 
mentally disordered offenders.  Research into whether the consideration of mental 
health factors provides any useful part in predicting recidivism amongst mentally 
disordered offenders is inconclusive.  Research by Monahan (1984) and Bonta et al. 
(1998) has found that the best predictors of violence amongst mentally disordered 
offenders are the same factors for non-mentally disordered offenders.  More recent 
research suggests that there may be a link between particular types of mental disorder 
and violent offending (Hodgkins, 2004).  However, as Moore (1996) points out 
mental disorder may have both an inhibiting or disinhibiting effect and the impact of 
the mental disorder on individual behaviour can only be assessed through 
consideration of the individual.   
 
Whilst discussions as to the use of risk assessments largely focus on their accuracy 
there is an ethical element to these debates.  Advocates of actuarial assessments argue 
that this approach should always be preferred to professional judgements or a 
combination of approaches (Bonta, 2002; Grove and Meehl, 1996).  Grove and Meehl 
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argue that to make decisions on professional judgement alone would be unethical.  
Their justification rests on the premise that professional judgement is unscientific and 
is therefore a poor use of public resources.  They also cite potential victims of 
offences and suggest that their eeds can only be addressed through taking a preventive 
approach based on actuarial evidence.  .  However, there are a number of problems 
with this line of argument.  Even if the process of risk assessment is accepted as 
scientific then a number of false positives are likely to occur.  As we have seen risk 
assessments do not predict risks but offer statements of probability.  This leaves the 
practitioner with the dilemma about how to act on this information.  Even if a risk 
assessment tool were to predict accuracy to a high degree this would lead to a 
substantial number of people being deprived of their liberty.  Whilst actuarial 
assessments may be seen to have a higher degree of accuracy than professional 
judgement they still have a significant scope for error, a point which is acknowledged 
by some of their advocates (Bonta, 2002).  Another argument against the use of 
actuarial approaches is that their claim to scientific validity is flawed.  Webb (2005) 
argues that risk assessments are based on normative presumptions about society and 
that focussing on probabilistic mechanisms diminishes understanding.  This argument 
reflects a concern for the potential for such tools to discriminate against certain 
groups such as minority ethnic groups.   
 
So, how might social workers approach service users subject to a s. 41 in an ethical 
manner?  As we have seen, policy and practice documents push practice towards a 
utilitarian framework.  Webb (2005) argues that social workers should reject this 
framework on the grounds that it imposes a narrow and potentially discriminatory 
framework on its subjects.   However, it should not be forgotten that service users 
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subject to s. 41 have committed serious offences against members of the public.  
Therefore a utilitarian position cannot be completely rejected.  Whilst Webb’s vision 
of social workers as strong evaluators is to be welcomed his analysis fails to 
acknowledge that there may be justifiable grounds to assess risk in order to aid public 
protection.  Social workers need to be informed about the circumstances of the people 
with which they work.  This should involve an assessment of an individual’s social 
networks and value systems but should not lead to a wholesale rejection of risk 
assessment tools.  Social workers should use actuarial assessments whilst remaining 
aware of their limitations.  Actuarial assessments should never be used as the only 
means to decide a course of action.  Professional judgement is needed in order to take 
into account the values embedded within the assessment tools.  It is also necessary to 
take into account individual difference and social factors.    
 
In using risk assessments social workers are demonstrating that they do not wholly 
reject a utilitarian stance.  However, the difficulty with adopting such a position is in 
making a judgement as to where risk taking can be justified. The current climate of 
intolerance for risk taking in general tends to discourage this.  As Rose argues (2002) 
there is a tendency for all untoward incidences to be seen as a result of failure in 
professional judgement.  This has led to risk averse behaviour within social work in 
which workers may minimise risk in order to aid defensibility (Carson, 2000).  This 
dilemma might be resolved through consideration of the Kantian position in which 
individuals are seen as being endowed with reason.  Whilst service users subject to s. 
41 are likely to have been mentally disordered at the time of their offence they may go 
on to regain autonomy.  One of the problems within the forensic mental health system 
is that the autonomy of the individual is not often re-evaluated with a view to 
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returning their legal rights.  In addition to this, the risks that service users may pose 
whilst mentally disordered or in a normal state of mind are often conflated.  For 
example, the restriction order is seen by the Ministry of Justice to be an effective form  
of risk management because re-offending rates are rated as low (Fennel, 2007).  
However, these figures do not take account of the autonomy of the service user who 
does re-offend.  If social workers are to act in an ethical manner then decision the 
actions of service users needs to be considered  in the light of their level of autonomy.   
 
The skill that social workers must develop is the ability to work within a framework 
which considers risk, whilst at the same time not loosing sight of the needs of the 
individual.  In doing so, they should accept the need to apply a utilitarian position 
which considers public protection whilst regularly re-evaluating the appropriateness 
of this position through consideration of service user autonomy.  In seeking to apply 
an appropriate balance practitioners should be aware of the limited research into 
service user views in this area.    
 
 
User views about social supervision 
There are currently five studies examining the views of those subject to conditional 
discharge (Dell and Grounds, 1995; Godin and Daves, 2006 Riordan et al., 2002; 
Davies et al., 2008; Coffey, 2008).  Davies et al. (2008) carried out a four year 
qualitative study into an English Medium Secure Unit.  A notable aspect of this study 
is service users’ awareness of the way that staff categorise risk and the ways that they 
adapt their behaviour in response to this.  Davies et al. focus particularly on the 
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environment of the medium secure unit and the difficulties of accurately assessing 
risk within it.  They write: 
‘Forensic mental health care is beset with inherent problems, ironies and 
deceptions (bluff and double bluff)’ (p. 87). 
They argue that in order to be released service users need to convince professionals 
that their ‘high risk’ status is no longer valid.  Professionals carry out assessments of 
risk in an environment that does not mirror that of the community.  Risk is measured 
through constant observation which is located in clinical notes.  These notes are then 
interpreted in clinical meetings, often without the author present.  Service users are 
aware of this process and learn to reflect on how their behaviour is interpreted.  In 
order to provide a credible narrative that will convince staff that their risk has reduced 
service users learn to second guess staff intentions.  This theme is echoed in research 
by Godin and Davies (2006) into the views of service users who had been subject to 
secure provisions.   Participants commonly stated that they had to ‘play the game’ 
(p.44).  One service user characterised this as agreeing unconditionally with his 
doctor’s view of him and spoke of the difficulty of acquiescing to a new ideology 
when his doctor changed.  Coffey’s research (2008) also found that service users 
acquiesced to professional views in order to achieve discharge.   He notes that service 
users often felt compelled to accept conditions proposed at their Mental Health 
Review Tribunal but that their perspective on these conditions varied once they had 
achieved discharge.   
 
Once service users are discharged from hospital they experience a new set of 
challenges.  Research by Dell and Grounds (1995) and Riordan et al. (2002) focussed 
on the positive and negative things about supervision from the service users’ point of 
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view and there is substantial overlap in these findings.   The process of supervision 
was largely valued by participants who found the support that they received to re-
enter the community useful.  In addition to this they valued the guarantee of longer 
term practical support from a social supervisor.   They also felt that the framework 
provided a guarantee that they would receive psychiatric treatment in the future.   
Participants expressed negative feelings towards coercive aspects of supervision and 
felt that it disallowed them personal autonomy and privacy.  Participants in the study 
by Dell and Grounds (1995) spoke of the threat of recall to hospital being a constant 
worry and complained of the arbitrary nature of such decisions.   In addition to this, 
they disliked attending meetings at the hospital in which they had been detained. 
Riordan et al. (2002) reported that some participants felt that being compelled to have 
injections of psychiatric medication was the worse aspect of supervision.   
 
Participants in the Dell and Grounds (1995) study made passing references to risk.  
The majority felt that it was right that they should be subject to supervision on 
discharge.  This view appears to be based on the practical support that was provided, 
although participants also acknowledged that its purpose was to protect the public 
from serious harm.  Dell and Grounds report that participants generally agreed with 
this purpose, although some felt that the supervision should be tapered off over time.    
 
In order to achieve discharge, service users have to negotiate a series of procedures 
with the concept of risk at their heart.    Despite this the research suggests that service 
users do not react in a wholly negative way towards social supervision.  The forensic 
mental health system is utilitarian in nature and its input into the lives of users can be 
experienced as double edged.  Thus whilst s. 41 is intended to limit  risk, the process 
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itself guarantees a certain level of service provision which is at least in part 
experienced as supportive. However, the presumption of limited autonomy which 
goes hand in hand with this framework can result in service users’ views not being 
heard.   In addition to this, the mechanism of social supervision is not experienced by 
service users to be responsive towards their increasing independence and as such 
takes little account of autonomy.  The accounts by service users also highlight that 
their own understanding of risk is an important but neglected part of the equation.  
Service users do not wholly reject the notion that they have posed a risk and that 
protective measures may therefore be warranted.  However, service users’ 
understanding of the concept of risk is currently under theorised (Davies et al., 2008) 
and future research should aim to develop a more sophisticated understanding of this 
 
Conclusion 
Service users subject to s. 41 of the MHA are defined both by their mental disorder 
and their offence(s).  Whilst they have always been subject to supervision, under 
current mental health legislation, the societal attitude to risk has altered, in turn 
changing  the kind of supervision that they experience .  Mental health policy has 
become increasingly pre-occupied with the concept of risk and now holds risk as one 
of the key principles around which services should be organised.  Forensic mental 
health care has also shifted its emphasis from a focus on dangerous individuals to a 
wider model that focuses on risk prevention.   
 
This paper has considered how three ethical frameworks might be used to support 
social work practice.  In considering whether or not to place an individual under a 
restriction order a court must be satisfied that they are suffering from a mental 
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disorder.  This places them outside a Kantian frame of ethics which presumes that 
individuals are endowed with reason.  Service users subject to s. 41 MHA are subject 
to a utilitarian frame of ethics in that they are subject to restrictions on their liberty 
and that the motive for these restrictions is for the good of society.  The current trend 
towards risk prevention makes service users subject to risk assessment procedures.  
These procedures claim to provide a greater degree of accuracy in risk prediction but 
actually provide practitioners with a probability statement rather than a means to 
prevent risk.  Advocates of virtue ethics have argued that social workers should reject 
such tools on the grounds that they are based on normative social presumptions which 
do not take adequate account of social difference.  However, such a position tends to 
minimise the validity of public protection.  Service users subject to s. 41 have 
committed serious offences and a degree of risk management is therefore justified.  
Social workers should not therefore completely reject a utilitarian approach.  In 
making judgements about risk it is legitimate for social workers to consider 
information from actuarial sources but these tools should never be used as the sole 
mechanism for decision making.  Social workers should take such information into 
account in light of social and individual factors and with an eye to the normative 
standards implicit in such assessments.  They should be aware of the particular 
environmental challenges that service users subject to s. 41 face moving between 
legal, hospital and community settings.  The way that service users conceptualise risk 
is little understood and future research in this area may improve social work 
interactions.  Finally, the adoption of a utilitarian approach poses the problem of when 
risk assessment should be discontinued.  In considering this problem social workers 
should return to the Kantian framework and give regular consideration to the service 
users’ ability to reason autonomously.    
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